We develop a dynamic capital valuation model in which each farm can take an action with farmvarying cost to increase the probability of not contracting a disease. In the presence of infection externalities, circumstances are identified under which multiple equilibria exist and where the one involving the most extensive set of action takers is socially optimal. It is suggested that costly capital markets are one factor in determining the extent of endemic disease in a region.
below, scholarship appears to have been silent on characterizing the economic nature of the equilibrium extent of endemic disease. 1 That there is an economic dimension to endemic animal disease becomes apparent upon perusing any introductory animal/poultry production book, such as those by Ensminger (1992) or Gillespie (2002) . Costly management strategies such as selective purchasing of feeder animals, implementing labor-consuming hygiene regimes, and timely equipment replacement are advocated. Beyond this, infection is an externality of a very public variety. A cursory assessment might suggest that developments in applied game theory should hold promise for better understanding the extent of endemic animal disease, and how to manage it. The intent of this article is to build a model to this end. Hennessy (2005) has considered private actions to guard against spatial spread of a disease already in a region to conclude that the way in which farm actions behave as local substitutes can lead to peculiar spatial patterns in taking protective actions. That paper also considered the risk of disease entry into a region. Then efforts by producers are more likely to complement, so that policies to promote inter-farm communication should be beneficial.
The work most closely related to the content of the present article is in Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005) . In it, two models are developed to address the strategy of internally supplying feeder animals for fattening. One looks at the externalities created by trading to take private advantage of feeder animal production cost differentials. The other looks at the internal organization of production to protect against the risk of disease entry into a farm. Both models are non-temporal in structure, viewing static farm decisions in which no distinction is made between farm disease statuses. This is an important limitation because in reality farms differ in the extent of disease. Farms transition between disease-free and diseased conditions over time, and this status heterogeneity drives much of public disease management policy. As a result, the models are very limited in what they can say about the nature of incentives to protect against disease and the consequences of such control practices as testing, movement controls, and herd depopulation.
In this paper we will develop a continuous-time dynamic model of farm-level capital values in which disease status is influenced by farm actions but is still stochastic. The approach is to use a stochastic model of transitions between two disease states in order to value firms in either state, and so to characterize incentives to change the state transition probabilities. Similar models have been used elsewhere in economics, where the best-known application is perhaps that of efficiency wage and involuntary unemployment by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . 2 We will lean quite heavily on parts of their model, although the interesting economics differ fundamentally. In our case the public goods externality of infectious disease is of interest whereas in their case it is the resource inefficiency effects of a moral hazard problem with no non-market externalities that is of interest.
The efficiency wage argument is that the incentive for an employee to apply productive effort that is incompletely monitored depends in part on the monitoring technology and in part on the reward differential. If the expected net present value of becoming unemployed as a result of shirking is not too low, the workers will logically shirk unless wages are raised. But then the labor market may not clear because the wage rate exceeds the marginal value product at full employment. While monitoring and involuntarily idle resources are of no concern to us, a parallel between our model and the efficiency wage model is the role of differential incentives in encouraging an action. 3
Our analysis points to the possibility of a multiplicity of equilibrium disease levels. It also suggests, in resonance with the efficiency wage model, that ostensibly wasteful public disease management programs could conceivably improve social welfare. This could occur by encouraging farmers to protect against becoming entangled in the bureaucracy of acquiring disease-free status. We show it is also possible that one class of disease management innovations could reduce social welfare. This class is comprised of innovations that increase the probability of transition from diseased status to disease-free status. The anomalous effect is due to a reduction in the loss expected from becoming diseased when externalities ensure that the level of protection against disease is socially inadequate. We also apply our model to better understanding the effects of a voluntary depopulation (buyout) scheme for infected herds.
Interestingly, some farms may both act to guard against infection and take a herd buyout payment upon becoming infected. The extent of social benefit from a buyout scheme will be constrained by moral hazard. A brief discussion concludes.
Framework
There are N animal-husbanding farms in a region where N is a large number, and all farms face the same incentives. Farm decision-makers are risk-neutral and are possessed of identical technological opportunities, with the exception of the cost of taking a biosecurity action against a disease. Even if this cost is common, however, it is not necessarily true that farms are identical because we will show that some may be infected with an endemic disease while some are not.
Infection is endogenous to our model, and we need to first develop the incentive structures facing farm decision-makers.
The model is in continuous time, and farms can be in one of the two states "disease-free" and "diseased" at any time. A disease-free farm earns profit flow R gross of any biosecurity action. If a disease-free farm takes the action then there is probability ( ) [0,1] b ⋅ ∈ per unit time that it becomes diseased. 7 The value of ( ) b ⋅ is written as an unspecified function because it depends on the extent of infection in the region. We will return to specify this relationship in due course.
If the action is not taken then the probability per unit time of becoming diseased changes to
The value of ( ) q ⋅ also depends on the extent of infection in the region. For the diseased farm, there is probability ( ) [0,1] a ⋅ ∈ per unit time that the farm becomes disease-free.
The value of ( ) a ⋅ , too, depends on the extent of infection in the region, and we will return to this relationship when we are ready to close the model. All of ( ) a ⋅ , ( ) b ⋅ , and ( ) q ⋅ are assumed to be continuous and differentiable in the usual sense.
4 Some degree of information asymmetry in disease status is likely, but we will show that excessive levels of endemic disease need have nothing to do with observable disease status. 5 Slight re-specifications of our model would allow for introducing human health externalities imposed on consumers. One way of doing this is to divide δ into farm δ The sorts of costs we have in mind include costs of labor and supplies for cleaning, as well as management time to acquire information about, educate, and monitor workers, feed suppliers, transport contractors, and others who move regularly between farms. Other costs are veterinary prophylactic expenditures, and capital expenditures on such projects as buildings (perhaps especially ventilation systems) and boundary maintenance. 7 For readers familiar with continuous-time treatment of Poisson processes, one may think of ( ) b ⋅ as the rate parameter. See Taylor and Karlin (1984) or Hoel, Port, and Stone (1987) for extensive developments on this tool and other related tools.
Solution
The decision on taking an action is essentially one of discounted present valuation of farms under the different decisions, and farm businesses are held to be infinitely lived entities. 8 Four valuations are of concern. One is that of farm value when the farm is disease-free and the action is taken, DF a Φ . Another is that of farm value when the farm is disease-free and the action is not
The third is that of farm value when the farm is diseased and the action would be taken were it not diseased, D a Φ . And the fourth is that of farm value when the farm is diseased and the action would not be taken were it not diseased, D na Φ .
With continuous-time discount rate 0 r > , a disease-free farm taking the action has asset value that must satisfy 9
(1) ( )( ). On the other hand, a disease-free farm not taking the action has asset value that must satisfy
Again, each side has an income stream interpretation. On the right-hand side the income flow from the present state is larger than in (1), but the probability rate of capital loss is also larger. A diseased farm that would take the action has asset value that must satisfy
while a diseased farm that would not take the action has asset value that must satisfy
If sold, then a diseased farm would presumably fetch less than a disease-free farm. 9 See page 436 in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . The adaptation to our context is straightforward.
Clearly there is a cut-off point, labeled ê and as yet to be determined, such that (I)
max[ , ]
DF D F D F a n a a Φ Φ =Φ on ê e ≤ , and (II) max [ , ] DF D F D F a n a n a Φ Φ =Φ on ê e > . 10 Case I: Assume first that ê e ≤ so that (1) and (3) are to be solved as a system, with solution
These equations might be best explained by taking the difference;
The change in farm value arising from contracting the disease may be viewed as bond debt
≤ because δ is at risk in the non-diseased state and e is incurred in that state with the hope of protecting against the loss of δ . If ( ) b ⋅ becomes larger then the change in farm value in (6) will become smaller. This is because the likelihood of shortly becoming diseased increases. Similarly, if ( ) a ⋅ becomes larger then the change in farm value will also become smaller. This is because the state of being diseased has become less consequential since the likelihood of soon revisiting the disease-free state has become larger.
Case II: Assume instead that ê e > so that (2) and (4) are a system, with solution
.
In this case the difference is
We have allocated ê e = to the action. Throughout we maintain the convention that an agent where two distinctions emerge relative to (6). Effort is not subtracted in the numerator because these firms do not take the biosecuring effort. The result is that a further discounting factor, ( ) q ⋅ , is introduced in the denominator.
Comparing (5b) with (7b), the action is taken under the disease-free state if DF
Calculate the difference between (6) and (8):
n a a a n a n a e e r c
Thus, the capitalized benefit to the farm upon having the good fortune of becoming disease-free is larger for those who act than for those who do not act on the cost set where farms do act, i.e.,
where ê e ≤ . This also, not coincidently, characterizes the set of farms that do act. 11 From (9), the measure of farms that would seek to biosecure were they disease-free is
Intuition would suggest that ( ) b ⋅ and ( ) ( ) b q ⋅ + ⋅ should both be decreasing in the extent of adoption, as measured by the value of ( ) F e or the value of ê . The probabilistic rate of farm infection for a given farm should decrease with the fraction of farms that biosecure, and this should be true whether (i.e., with ( ) b ⋅ probability rate) or not (i.e., with ( ) ( ) b q ⋅ + ⋅ probability rate) the farm in question biosecures. As for ( ) a ⋅ it should be at worst invariant to, and perhaps increase with, the fraction of farms that biosecure. This is because there are then fewer opportunities to become infected, so that the effect of the extent of adoption on the value of ( ) c ⋅ is ambiguous.
acts when indifferent. 11 View the choice problem in the disease-free state as max [ , ] DF D F a n a Φ Φ , thus motivating the presence of these two arguments in (10). The other two arguments arise because of the linearity (12) extensively, it should be clear that an elementary understanding of fixedpoint theory would be useful when working with our model. For an economic overview, we refer the reader to Milgrom and Roberts (1994) or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995 Φ > Φ so that these farms will act. In general, ( ) 1 e J e < ensures the existence of at most one equilibrium.
Social Optimum
Note that the long-run stationary probabilities of a farm's disease states are 16 (15) warrant comment. One is that the interior minimization problem makes no reference to r so that the social optimum in stationary equilibrium is independent of r . This is despite the relevance of r in (12). In stationary equilibrium, farms transition between diseased and disease-free states but the discounted present value consequences of this are a wash in the aggregate. This is because the flows of farms from and to a particular disease state just balance.
equilibrium. 16 See page 256 in Taylor and Karlin (1984) or page 94 in Hoel, Port, and Stone (1987) for extensive developments on stationary probabilities for Poisson-type models. The Prob[ | ] A B notation indicates the probability of state A given condition B.
The other aspect is that the minimization problem may be broken into three sorts of losses. the hazard rate is increasing. This is the standard assumption of monotone hazard rate, as applied in the mechanism design literature (see p. 267 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
In addition, from (12), if the left-and right-hand expressions in (18) 
Policy Issues
In this section we discuss some policy implications of the model, as developed to this juncture. Point 1: If there are multiple equilibria, then the highest ê value is preferred.
In light of (18) the likelihood is that too few farms take the action. In light of (12) and figure 1, the highest among these equilibria will support the largest level of social welfare. 19 The question then becomes how to sustain the highest equilibrium. This leads to our next point.
Point 2: Relative loss determines the incentive to take the action.
Equation (12) shows that an increase in the value of δ shifts equilibrium values of ê upward; see figure 2. While this may seem intuitive to the point of being obvious, the policy implications may not be at all intuitive. We will comment on some of these policy implications now and defer others until we develop the model further.
Bureaucratic costs imposed on farm businesses that become diseased may be a form of increasing δ beyond market penalties. While bureaucracy imposes a burden on taxpayers and also incurs grower transactions costs, the result may be a lower level of endemic disease and the social gains may more than offset the social losses. It is important to bear in mind that the bureaucracy cost need bring with it no disease fighting benefit. Its actions may in no way assist in the technical problems associated with eliminating the disease from a farm, and still it can serve a positive function. Regulatory restrictions that have little direct merit may also have similar effect. For example, a diseased farm may be denied the right to sell produce into a premium market (e.g., liquid milk) even though the disease has no impact on the quality of that product.
The point we are making comes close to, but is not the same as, the efficiency wage argument. There, the problem is one of moral hazard in the face of imperfect monitoring where there are no non-market spillovers beyond the principal and agent in an employment relationship. Here, the problem is that non-action creates an external effect in increasing the pool of infectious disease.
Point 3: If 0 δ = then no farm takes the action.
Solution ˆ0 e = is then the unique Nash equilibrium solution to (12) . In this case, first-best is supported because the disease causes no deterioration in production. However, consider the different context where disease causes no deterioration in production but the produce is a health risk. 20 Then ˆ0 e = , first-best would not be supported, and market or non-market intervention might improve market performance. Public awareness campaigns might increase demand for verified private labeling on the disease status of the originating herd. As with campaigns to control bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis, though, produce condemnation may be deemed the more effective approach (Smith 1958) .
Point 4: A high discount rate reduces the action threshold.
Equation (12) shows that an increase in the value of r shifts equilibrium values of ê downward.
In countries with inefficient capital markets or low stocks of capital available for investment, one would expect higher levels of endemic disease. This is because the present value of the private gain from attaining disease-free status is discounted heavily. The reason is distinct from that of high endemic disease levels because of capital constraints at the public level, often referred to as a reason for disease problems in less developed countries (Leonard 2000) . 
The first two right-hand terms are certainly positive. We have argued that an increase in ê likely increases the value of ( , ) through reducing the cost of becoming diseased, discourage action taking to such an extent that the positive direct effect of the innovation is overwhelmed.
Voluntary Depopulation Scheme
Consider now the situation in which the only regulatory intervention is that the government buys out a herd when the owner comes forth truthfully, out of self-interest, to report owning a diseased herd. The herd is culled with compensation such that farm value becomes K , and it is assumed that this certainly clears disease from the farm. The farm is then put back into production.
Two private decisions are now to be made on each herd, but they are never made at the same time. In the disease-free state the decision on taking the biosecurity action has to be made. In the diseased state, and more precisely immediately upon contracting the disease, the decision on reporting to the government has to be made. Table 1 delineates the four cases that emerge. We will consider each of the four cases in turn, and we will then identify the values in ( , ) e K space such that a farm makes this pair of decisions.
Case A: ( , ) a nc , or act when disease-free and do not report for culling when diseased. We have already solved for this case in (5) We have not solved for this problem and must return to first principles. Instead of (2) and (4), recognize that farm value upon succumbing to the disease is K so that the fundamental equations become .
When Case A Is Chosen
The two criteria that must be satisfied in order for this to this occur are , , Both e and K need to be relatively low in order for this case to apply. Further pertinent comments on each of the cases are provided in appendix A.
When Case B Is Chosen
The two criteria that must be satisfied in order for this to occur are , , For this case to apply, e needs to be relatively high and K needs to be relatively low.
When Case C Is Chosen
The criteria that must be satisfied in order that this occur are This case occurs when K is sufficiently high to make culling attractive, and e is low enough to elicit action but not so low that capital value under a "no cull" decision rises beyond K . Supporting analysis is provided in appendix A. We turn now to the effect of the buyout program on the extent of disease. This depends very much on whether 25 While the derivative is not defined where ê e = , the limits from both sides are non-positive. 26 Whether the reduction in the equilibrium level of disease justifies the losses due to culled stock is beyond the scope of the present analysis, as it would involve extending the model to
Action to Become Disease-Free
In this section we ask whether changing the action from one of securing against a disease to one of increasing the likelihood of becoming disease-free changes the nature of the results. Suppose that the only action concerns the effort to become disease-free and it may be taken only when the farm is diseased. Its effect is to increase ( ) a ⋅ to ( ) ( ) a q ⋅ + ⋅ , whereas before, non-action increased
As before, four values are of concern. These are farm value when the farm is with properties almost identical to those of (12).
Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of endemic animal disease that emphasizes economic incentives. The model is quite versatile in that it can be used to study diseases in which only livestock productivity is affected and diseases in which only the health of consumers is affected.
The model emphasizes the role of punishment in strengthening the incentive to protect against disease. This role may induce welfare reduction upon the event of an exogenous technical innovation that makes regaining disease-free status easier. The model also points to a place for well-functioning capital markets in reducing the extent of endemic disease. In order to demonstrate the model's potential for policy analysis, the policy of voluntary reporting for herd buyout was developed in some detail.
accommodate salvage value.
The analysis might be expanded upon in at least three directions. First, a stationary equilibrium has been assumed. A better understanding of adjustment paths would be helpful when seeking to better understand responses to external (e.g., weather) and policy-induced shocks. Methods in Kimball (1994) could be useful in this regard. The second regards the accuracy of tests for a disease. For that issue, our model would have to be adapted to accommodate false positive and false negative readings when disease status cannot be established from profitability. A speculation is that a test improvement that better identifies herd recovery may reduce the incentive to biosecure and so may reduce social welfare.
The third issue is to introduce scale-related heterogeneities into the model. The relationship between size and endemic disease warrants scrutiny because backyard production has been suggested as a key propagating factor in disease outbreaks (Olsen et al. 2005; Tiensin et al. 2005 ). In addition, agricultural policies that pass the World Trade Organization test of being decoupled may encourage smaller growers to stay in business and so may reduce the rate of consolidation in animal production (Chau and De Gorter 2005) . Biosecurity costs are unlikely to be scale-neutral. Some, such as acquiring specialized knowledge of diseases, are likely to carry a high fixed cost component. On the other hand, larger production units are more vulnerable to heavy losses upon disease entry. Absent strong comparative advantage in the form of labor or feed costs, production is unlikely to be concentrated in regions with severe endemic disease problems. If a traditional production region with initially fragmented production also has weak incentives to protect against disease, the region may be stuck in an inefficient equilibrium. Farms in the region may not adopt technical innovations that involve an increase in scale because of the disease environment. 
